China and the Middle East: From Crisis Management to Building a New Regional Security

The crises in the Middle East are no longer isolated conflicts that can be dealt with individually. Over the past decades, the region has transformed into an intertwined web of security, political, and economic conflicts, where the interests of regional and international powers intersect, and the issues of Palestine, Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon, and the security of the Gulf and the Red Sea are all intertwined. It has become difficult to achieve genuine stability without addressing the entire picture. From this perspective, the initiative proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping during his visit to Cairo on September 2, 2016, acquires particular significance. In his talks with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, Xi Jinping presented four proposals for building a new security system in the Middle East based on the concept of "common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security." Notably, China is not offering a new military prescription for the region, nor is it proposing an alliance directed against any specific party. Rather, it is proposing a re-evaluation of the very philosophy of regional security: from security based on the balance of power and external interventions to security based, according to the Chinese vision, on dialogue, sovereignty, development, and cooperation. The first proposal: that the people of the region should have control over their own destiny. This first point seems most closely linked to the core of the Middle Eastern crisis: that the people of the region should play the primary role in determining their future, while rejecting external interventions and encouraging regional states to engage in dialogue on peace and security and to reshape the regional security system. This idea practically means that the security of the Middle East cannot remain contingent on agreements made outside the region, on the conflicts of major powers, or on equations that use regional states as arenas for settling scores. Sovereignty is not merely a political slogan; it is a prerequisite for building stability. The more capable the countries of the region are of managing their differences through dialogue, the less room there will be for external intervention, and the more possible it will be to move from a logic of "crisis management" to a logic of "crisis prevention." However, achieving this also requires responsibility from the countries of the region themselves; it is impossible to demand that external powers refrain from interfering while some regional actors continue to use tools outside their borders. True regional security begins when sovereignty becomes a shared principle, not a demand raised solely against others. The second proposal: The region's crises cannot be separated. The second Chinese proposal stems from a reality that has become clear to everyone: the crises in the Middle East are interconnected, and therefore, partial solutions will not produce lasting peace. China places the Palestinian issue at the center of this equation, emphasizing that the Palestinian issue should not be neglected or marginalized, as it is the core of the Middle East problem. Herein lies the importance of a comprehensive vision; because the continuation of the Palestinian conflict is not only a humanitarian and political crisis, but also affects the overall security environment in the region, fueling tension and polarization and giving the conflicting powers new justifications for continuing. It is difficult to build a stable Middle East while the Palestinian issue remains open to wars, displacement, settlement expansion, and a lack of political horizon. Therefore, any new regional security system needs to address the root causes of the conflict, not just contain its consequences. This means that security cannot be a substitute for a political solution, but rather must be part of it. Third proposal: Development is not solely a result of security. Indeed, this aspect of the Chinese initiative is perhaps the most profound at the strategic level. China directly links development and security, emphasizing that long-term stability in the Middle East depends primarily on development, with a focus on protecting international waterways, promoting economic cooperation, aligning the interests of the region's countries, building trust, and eliminating the environment that allows conflicts to persist. This vision differs from traditional approaches that view security primarily as a military issue. A region possessing energy resources, wealth, and a crucial geographical location should not simultaneously be one of the world's most resource- and economically draining regions due to conflict. Transforming competing interests into shared interests may be one of the most important keys to stability. When trade, energy, transportation, investment, infrastructure, and maritime routes become shared interests among nations, the cost of war will rise, while the cost of peace will become lower and more beneficial for all. This highlights the importance of the Chinese experience in linking development with stability, rather than treating them as separate paths. The fourth proposal concerns the role of international law instead of double standards. China calls for enhanced international coordination based on the UN Charter and international law, rejects double standards, and emphasizes the need to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the region's countries, while supporting the UN's role in addressing Middle Eastern issues. This point sends a clear message to international powers: the Middle East is not a lawless region, and the rules for dealing with one country should not differ from another based on its political position or alliances. The stability of the international system begins with the equal application of its rules. Whenever one party feels that international law is applied to it alone while other parties are granted exceptions, confidence in the international system itself declines. Hence, the Chinese call to abandon double standards goes beyond the Middle East crisis to a broader question concerning the shape of the international system towards which the world is heading. Why Cairo? Choosing Egypt to present this vision is not a mere protocol detail. Egypt is a pivotal Arab state, possessing significant political, geographical, and security weight, and is directly linked to the issues of Palestine, Gaza, the Red Sea, Sudan, and Arab security. Most importantly, the visit came within the context of deepening the Chinese-Egyptian partnership. The visit witnessed the signing of more than twenty cooperation agreements in various fields, including the economy, trade, artificial intelligence, supply chains, the digital economy, science and technology, education, and transportation. This reveals the nature of China's vision for the region: security and development are two sides of the same coin. China does not propose a security system separate from the economy, but rather believes that building common interests can be one of the tools to prevent the return of conflicts. What does this vision mean for Iraq? Iraq, by virtue of its geographical and political position, cannot be excluded from any serious discussion about the future of security in the Middle East. Iraq lies at the heart of regional balances and is linked by relations and interests with the Gulf states, Iran, Turkey, Syria, and Jordan. It also represents an important bridge between the Levant and the Gulf. Therefore, the establishment of a regional security system based on respect for sovereignty, non-interference, dialogue, and development can directly serve Iraq, provided that Iraq itself is part of this equation and not merely an arena where the interests of others intersect. Most importantly, the Iraqi experience over the past decades confirms that security cannot be reduced to the military aspect alone. State stability requires a strong economy, capable institutions, balanced relations with neighboring countries, and preventing Iraqi territory from becoming a battleground for others. Therefore, Iraq can view the Chinese initiative not merely as a Chinese project, but as an opportunity to revisit a broader question: Can Middle Eastern countries move from a policy of coexisting with crises to building a regional system that prevents their recurrence? China... Partner or Alternative? The Chinese move should not be interpreted as an attempt to replace one international power with another. More accurately, China is trying to present itself as an international power capable of combining diplomacy, development, and economic relations, leveraging its extensive ties with various regional actors. This gives the Chinese initiative a unique opportunity, but at the same time, it presents it with a real test: Can Beijing translate these principles into practical paths, or will they remain within the realm of general political vision? The region needs not only new initiatives, but also implementation mechanisms, continuous regional dialogue, political guarantees, development projects, and a genuine will from the region's countries to abandon the logic of axes and proxy conflicts. An idea worthy of discussion began in Cairo. The four initiatives presented by the Chinese president in Cairo can be summarized in one equation: independent regional decision-making, a comprehensive approach to crises, development that fosters security, and international law without double standards. However, the true value of this initiative will not be measured by the elegance of its formulation, but rather by the ability of Middle Eastern countries to translate it into reality. The region does not suffer from a shortage of political initiatives and projects, but rather from a lack of capacity to transform understandings into permanent institutions and mechanisms. Perhaps the message is The most important message to emerge from Cairo is that the future of the Middle East should not remain hostage to endless wars, that security cannot be built by force alone, and that development is not a luxury postponed until after stability, but rather one of its essential prerequisites. Building a more stable Middle East will not happen overnight, but it begins with acknowledging a simple truth: no state can achieve lasting security at the expense of its neighbors' security, and no region can build a stable future if it remains hostage to the conflicts of the past. From Cairo, China posed a question that transcends the initiative itself: Is it time for the Middle East to create its own security system with the help of its own states, and to transform from an arena for international conflict into a partner in shaping the new international order?